

TOP SECRET

## EXHIBIT D

INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

## SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

1. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 17 February 1945, concerning investigation of Major Clausen, supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
2. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 3 March 1945, concerning investigation of Major Clausen, supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
3. Receipt from the District Intelligence Office 14ND of designated material, 19 April 1945.
4. List of Photostated copies of C. I. D. files furnished to Lt. Colonel Clausen, 19 April 1945.
5. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 23 May 1945, concerning investigation of Lt. Colonel Clausen supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
6. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 1 August 1945, fourth progress report of Colonel Clausen's investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
7. Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, 12 September 1945, fifth progress report of Colonel Clausen's investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, 12 September 1945.

[247]

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy.

Subject: Fifth progress report of Lt. Colonel Clausen's investigations supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. Since 1 August 1945 I have concluded the investigations of the following::

a. *Army Personnel interviewed:*

General George C. Marshall  
 Major General Charles D. Herron  
 Major General Sherman Miles  
 Colonel Otis K. Sadtler  
 Colonel George W. Bicknell  
 Colonel Rex W. Minckler  
 Colonel Harold Doud  
 Colonel Harold G. Hayes  
 Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett

b. *British Army personnel interviewed:*

Colonel Gerald Wilkinson

c. *Civilians interviewed:*

Miss Mary J. Dunning  
 Miss Louise Prather

d. *Related conferences:*

Mr. Harvey H. Bundy  
 Major General Myron C. Cramer  
 Commodore Inglis, ONI  
 Brig. General Carter W. Clarke  
 Brig. General Thomas North  
 Colonel Ernest W. Gibson  
 [248] Colonel William J. Hughes  
 Lieutenant John F. Baecher, USN  
 Mr. John F. Sonnett  
 Mr. A. T. Klotz

e. *Affidavit evidence obtained:*

General George C. Marshall  
 Major General Sherman Miles  
 Major General Charles D. Herron  
 Colonel Otis K. Sadtler  
 Colonel Rex W. Minckler  
 Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett  
 Captain Howard W. Martin  
 Miss Mary J. Dunning  
 Miss Louise Prather

Henry C. Clausen,  
 HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
*Lt. Colonel, JAGD.*

---

TOP SECRET

[249]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
 Washington, 1 August 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy.

Subject: Fourth Progress Report of Colonel Clausen's Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. *Activities Reported:* Investigations at Blandford, Blenchley Park, London, England; Cannes, Marseille, Paris, Versailles, France; Casserta, Italy; Berlin, Frankfurt on Main, Potsdam, Germany; and Washington, D. C., were conducted during 15 May to 1 August 1945.

a. *Army Personnel Interviewed:*

Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow  
 Lt. General W. B. Smith  
 Maj. General John R. Deane  
 Brig. General Thomas J. Betts  
 Colonel George W. Bicknell  
 Colonel Rufus S. Bratton  
 Colonel Warren J. Clear  
 Colonel Robert E. Schukraft  
 Major Louis Stone

b. *British Navy Personnel Interviewed:*

Captain Edward Hastings

c. *Civilians Interviewed:*

Dr. Stanley Hornbeck  
 George W. Renchard  
 John F. Stone

d. *Related Conferences:*

Harvey H. Bundy  
 General Thomas T. Handy  
 Maj. General Myron C. Cramer  
 Maj. General Otto Nelson  
 Brig. General Carter Clarke  
 [250] Brig. General Thomas North  
 Brig. General G. Bryan Conrad  
 Brig. General Marion Van Voorst  
 Colonel C. W. Christenberry  
 Colonel R. W. Hauenstein  
 Colonel F. W. Hilles  
 Captain Wm. T. Carnahan  
 Captain Edmund H. Kellogg  
 John F. Sonnett  
 Admiral Henry K. Hewitt

e. *Affidavit Evidence Obtained:*

Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow  
 Lt. General W. B. Smith  
 Maj. General John R. Deane  
 Colonel George W. Bicknell  
 Colonel Rufus S. Bratton  
 Colonel Robert E. Schukraft  
 George W. Renchard  
 John F. Stone  
 Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Betts

f. *Documentary Evidence Obtained:*

British radio intelligence material

2. *Significant Features of Additional Evidence Developed:*

(a) *Colonel Bratton's Testimony Before APHB:* Colonel Bratton admitted to me that his testimony given to the APHB was incorrect on some very important subjects, and should be revised accordingly. These changes include the following points:

1. He previously testified that the top secret radio intelligence material, contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", had been delivered to the President, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

But, in his affidavit to me made when his memory was more refreshed, he admitted that he could not recall with any degree of accuracy, and that there were no records to show who delivered what to whom during the period in question.

[251] 2. He previously testified that he personally delivered the top secret radio intelligence material to the officers concerned.

In his affidavit to me, however, he admitted that in addition to himself, deliveries were made by Major or Lt. Colonel Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel.

3. He previously testified that on the evening of 6 December 1941 he delivered to the Office of the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., and the office of the Secretary of State, the thirteen parts of the fourteen part Japanese reply to the settlement conditions which the Secretary of State had given the Japs on 26 November 1941. He had also testified that he put the thirteen parts of this message on the desk of the Chief of Staff. He had further testified that on 6 December 1941 he had given sets of the thirteen parts to Lt. General W. B. Smith for the Chief of Staff, to Brig. General Gailey for Lt. General Gerow, and to Maj. General Miles as G-2, and that it was his recollection that these officers received these sets that night. He had also testified that on 6 December 1941 he discussed the thirteen part message with General Miles.

But in his affidavit to me he admitted that the only set of the thirteen parts message he delivered on 6 December 1941 was to the duty officer of the Secretary of State; that the sets for the Secretary of War, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, the Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D., were not delivered the night of 6 December 1941; that these sets were not given the night of 6 December 1941 to General Smith, General Gerow or General Miles; that he could not recall having discussed the message with General Miles on 6 December 1941; that he did not know how the set for the Chief of Staff came into his possession, although he claimed that he had asked Colonel Dusenbury to deliver it on 6 December 1941 to the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury admitted in his affidavit to me that he received the messages on 6 December 1941, but that he did not deliver any until after 9:00 A. M. on the morning of 7 December 1941.

[252] 4. He previously testified that on the morning of 7 December 1941 he arrived at his office about 7:00 or 8:00 A. M. and telephoned the home of the Chief of Staff at about 9:00 A. M., and that the Chief of Staff arrived at his office at 11:25 A. M.

In his affidavit to me, he fixed the time at which the Chief of Staff was in his office on 7 December 1941 as being between 10:30 and 11:30 A. M.

The affidavit of Maj. General Deane fixed the time at which Colonel Bratton arrived at his office on 7 December 1941 as between 9:00 and 9:30 A. M., which also agrees more nearly with the recollection of Colonel Dusenbury.

Affidavits mentioned in previous reports, as well as the new affidavits of Generals Gerow, Smith, Deane, and Messrs. Stone and Renchard, tend to support the revised testimony of Colonel Bratton.

(b) *"Winds Code" Message:* Investigation at British sources failed to reveal that the British ever intercepted an implementation message. Apparently, the evidence to date of the existence of such an implementation depends primarily on the recollection of certain Navy witnesses, and among whom there is a conflict. Colonel Schukraft claimed to have seen an implementation in a form different from that testified to by the Navy witnesses. On this subject it should be recalled that the action to be taken by the Jap Consular and diplomatic agents on receipt of an implementing message, namely, destruction of codes, actually was ordered by Tokyo in a radio which was intercepted about 4 December 1941. As I previously reported, this information was given to Short prior to 7 December 1941, according to his G-2 and Assistant G-2. Short testified before the Navy Court of



Inquiry, however, that he did not get this information, and that to him it would have been the only important part of the message which the Chief of Staff sent him by radio on 7 December 1941. Assuming that the recollections of Short's two members of his Staff are correct, then Short had received prior to 7 December 1941 the ultimate in available information according to his own statement of what should have been given him for a different alert than that which he had ordered on 27 November 1941.

[253] (c) *Sufficiency of War Department Warnings to Short*: General Gerow in his affidavit to me sets forth detailed reasons why in his opinion the overseas commanders were given adequate information of impending events. Also why the radio intelligence messages were not sent to the commanders. In this regard, testimony should be recalled to the effect that, for security reasons, the Army was restricted by the Navy from sending these messages, and that representatives of the Navy had stated that the Navy unit at Honolulu was getting the messages from their own facilities.

(d) *Conflicts in Testimony*: Many of the points heretofore in doubt and hereinbefore mentioned have been sufficiently developed to reach appropriate conclusions. A number of conflicts remain, however, which it is planned to resolve by completion of the investigation.

3. *Progress and Objectives*: The investigation will be concluded by exploration of the remaining leads and the making of a final and comprehensive report. This will involve:

(a) Interviews with Generals Marshall, Herron and Miles, Colonels Bicknell, Doud, Minkler and Sadtler, Major Bash, Messrs. Roberts, Hoover, Friedman, and Wilkinson, and Misses Adams, Cave, and Prather.

(b) Examinations of the testimony given Admiral Hewitt by Admiral Mayfield, Captain McCollum, Commanders Kramer and Mason, and other Navy witnesses if necessary; the engagement book of former Secretary of State Hull; the statement by General Smith; and the recent G-2 examination involving Mr. Friedman, resulting from Navy disclosures.

(c) It is recommended that, for security reasons, the Secretary of War direct all witnesses heretofore and hereafter examined by me to send or give me forthwith, for filing with the records of this investigation, any copies of affidavits made before me and any incidental and related notes or papers which may be in their possession or under their control, they to advise me in writing that this has been done or that there are no such records, and that they be advised that these records will be available in the War Department in the event access thereto is ever required.

Henry C. Clausen.

HENRY C. CLAUSEN.

Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

[254]

TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, 23 May 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy:

Subject: Investigation of Colonel Clausen

Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. *Activities Reported*: Investigations at Honolulu, Guam, Saipan, Leyte, and Luzon were conducted during the period 26 March to 12 May, 1945.

a. *Army Personnel Interviewed*:

General Douglas MacArthur

Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland

Major Gen. C. A. Willoughby

Major Gen. Spencer B. Aiken

Major Gen. C. L. Ruffner

Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder

Brig. Gen. C. A. Powell

Brig. Gen. J. J. Twitty

Brig. Gen. M. W. Marston

Colonel O. N. Thompson

Lt. Col. Byron N. Meurlott

Major H. H. Henderson

Major Maresh

Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane

b. *Navy Personnel Interviewed:*

Captain E. T. Layton  
 Captain Harper  
 Captain W. J. Holmes  
 Captain T. A. Huckins  
 Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr.  
 Commander Burr  
 Commander Carr  
 Lieut. Donald Woodrum, Jr.  
 Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel

[255] c. *Civilians Interviewed:*

D. R. Dawson  
 Robert L. Shivers  
 Harry L. Dawson  
 John E. Russell

d. *Related Conferences:*

General Richardson  
 Admiral Nimitz  
 Admiral McMorris  
 Admiral Towers  
 Mr. H. H. Bundy  
 Gen. Carter W. Clarke  
 Gen. Myron C. Cramer  
 Commander John F. Sonnett

e. *Affidavits and Statements Obtained:*

General Douglas MacArthur  
 Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland  
 Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby  
 Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder  
 Brig. C. A. Powell  
 Brig. Gen. M. W. Marston  
 Colonel O. N. Thompson  
 Lt. Col. Byron N. Meurlott  
 Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane  
 Captain E. T. Layton  
 Captain W. J. Holmes  
 Captain T. A. Huckins  
 Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr.  
 Lieut. Donald Woodrum, Jr.  
 Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel  
 Mr. John E. Russell  
 Mr. Robert L. Shivers

f. *Documentary Evidence Obtained:*

1. British intelligence material (SIS) consisting of more than 200 reports from Gerald Wilkinson at Manila to Honolulu, from July 1941 to and including December 1941.

2. Files of the Hawaiian Department, G-2, Army Contact Office. These are set forth on the attached receipt dated 19 April 1945.

[256] 3. Navy District Intelligence Office files, set forth on the attached receipt dated 19 April 1945.

4. Files of the Hawaiian Department, AG. These include photostats of file copies of pertinent communications received before 7 December 1941.

5. FBI records of telephone intercepts and British SIS reports.

2. *Significant Features of Additional Evidence Developed:*

a. *Short's Defenses:* Assumption that Navy knew the whereabouts of the Jap fleet: Actually, as could have been ascertained from plots prepared by Captain Holmes, USN, and daily Communication Intelligence Summaries prepared by Captain Rochefort (see affidavit of Captain Huckins), the Navy did not have such information.

Claim that War Department acquiesced in reply of Short to radio of 27 November 1941 signed "Marshall", and thereafter did not give him additional information: The reply of Short also stated "liaison with Navy." Attention is invited to new evidence of items of intelligence possessed or available to Short.

Claim that a more effective alert would have interfered with training and would have alarmed the civilian population: Evidence shows there was no civilian alarm when the Herron all-out alert of 1940 was ordered and Short did not order



the radar into 24 hours operation and did not order any visual lookouts or sound detectors against a possible air attack (See notes on Navy court testimony).

b. *Intelligence and Information available to Short*: Short and his G-2 testified in effect that they were almost wholly dependent on the War Department for information and that they actually received very little. New evidence indicates that the Hawaiian Department received a great deal more military and diplomatic information than has been previously developed. For example, the British SIS reports (See Russell & Shivers affidavits), the intercepts of telephone conversations in and out of the Jap Consulate (See Emanuel, Shivers and Woodrum affidavits), some commercial radio traffic in and out of the Jap Consulate (See Mars-ton and Shivers affidavits), information from the Navy District Intelligence Office and the Fleet Intelligence Officer (See files and affidavit of Captain Layton). Much material was gathered from observers, travellers, and Washington sources, and evaluated and disseminated by the Army contact office.

[257] Various papers dealing with this intelligence were initialed by Short. For example, see the Inter-Staff Routing Slip, 11 September 1941, concerning information from the Tokyo Naval Attache as to Japan's intentions; the Slip, 6 November 1941; the War Department Military Attache Report, 3 November 1941; the Special Intelligence Report, 17 October 1941; the memo of Colonel Bicknell, 21 November 1941; the War Department G-2 Report, June 1941, regarding the lurking of small submarines in Hawaiian waters preparatory to attacks on Pearl Harbor; the War Department G-2 Report, 28 August 1941, of a warning by one George Paisn; the Contact Office Report and Estimate, 25 October 1941; the report 19 June 1941 of Japanese books.

A detailed study of the foregoing and other items of intelligence, in relation to testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, will be made on completion of the investigation.

Incidentally, a special investigation by Colonel H. S. Burwell, AC, 9 July 1941, reported to General Short many deficiencies of his Command. Among other things, the report set forth that the attitude of mind in the Hawaiian Department, the Hawaiian Air Force and Hickman Field was deficient as to "the immediate need for positive preparations to prevent the success of predictable acts of planned and ordered sabotage," and further "it is found that a considerable portion of the Command do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now existing between inter-continental theaters of war and our local sphere of action." The report further stated that the Command was not alert to:

"(a) The possibility at any time of an overt naval retaliation on our part to an overt hostile act either near or far away. \* \* \*

"(d) Or, an abrupt conflict with Japan over America's proposed aid to Russia."

The report found the cause for this attitude of mind was, among other things, traceable:

"(1) To the ingrained habits of peace-time.

"(2) To the carefree sense of easy control born in the isolation of a tropical island garrisoned by large forces. \* \* \*

"(4) To the relative inattention accorded in peace-time to intelligence functions as compared to that given to operations and supply functions. \* \* \*

[258] "(11) To the lower priority accorded intelligence in consequent of the above first needs. \* \* \*

"(14) To the loss of aggressive initiative implicit in a purely defensive waiting attitude.

"(15) To the fact that no serious evidence of factual record exists, from which to induce the proof that a critical need at present exists for a critical concern for the future."

The report concluded:

"(a) That the measurable degree of sinking morale is due to a feeling of instability, bias or lack of confidence in the general set-up, not to the effects of subversive activities within the command; although such a condition naturally provides a more fertile breeding grounds for hostile proclivities."

Under Appreciations, the report stated:

"(a) Appreciation is expressed for the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and of Mr. Shivers, Federal Bureau of Investigation."

c. *Inminence of War with Japan*: Short testified that if this had been known to him he would have ordered a different alert. The affidavit of Fielder and the documentary evidence mentioned shows that Short was so informed. For instance, see the estimates dates 17 October 1941 and 25 October 1941 by Colonel

Bicknell, initialed by Short; the memo of Bicknell, dated 21 November 1941; and the speeches of Short and Kimmel, reported in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 18 September 1941, a copy of which is attached.

d. *"Winds Code" Message*: Contrary to Short's testimony and the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, this information was given the Army at Honolulu. See the affidavit of Shivers, verifying that of Colonel Bicknell. It should be noted that in the documentary evidence is a translation of the Jap Consul's desk pad. He had written thereon several wave lengths of Jap broadcasts on the date the Winds Code was broadcast. No evidence was found however, that the code was implemented (see statement of Holtwick), other than the 3 December 1941 British SIS report to Honolulu, copy of which went to Colonel Bicknell, reading in part:

[259] "(C) Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South."

Significantly, the date 3 December 1941 agrees with the testimony of Captain Safford as to when he saw an implementing message to the code in similar terms.

e. *5 December 1941, War Department G-2 Message*: See affidavits of Fielder, Powell, Thompson and Lane. In view of previous statements recently obtained from Colonel Bicknell and personnel of G-2, it is a reasonable certainty that the message was received by the Army in Hawaii on 5 December 1941.

f. *Destruction by Japs of Codes*: Short denied receiving this information and claimed that he would have considered it most important, calling for a different alert order. But Fielder states in his affidavit that he gave his information to Short on 6 December 1941. See also the affidavit of Shivers, verifying that of Colonel Bicknell.

g. *Pearl Harbor as attack target*: If the Jap Consul commercial radio traffic, which was available at Hawaii to the Navy especially from the latter part of November 1941, included the reports as to ships in the harbor, then it was similar to that received at Washington. Several messages are contained in the documentary evidence above which are indicative that some such traffic was available at Hawaii before 7 December 1941. Further details are being explored in conjunction with the Navy. The availability of these messages is confirmed by the affidavits of Shivers, Marston, and testimony of Captain Rochefort.

It should be noted that the Jap inquiries as to ships movements included reports at many other places, such as Manila, Seattle, etc. Also, so far as Hawaii specifically was concerned, intercepts of telephone conversations at the Jap Consulate revealed that in 1940 a Jap agent was collecting information on ship movements.

Another item of intelligence which pointed to Pearl Harbor was the 3 December 1941 message from the Jap Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, giving the visual signals devised by Otto Kuhn to report ship movements. This message falls into the category stated as requiring further exploration as to its availability before 7 December 1941.

[260] As to the Army Signal Intelligence Service activities at Hawaii, see the Powell affidavit. Two of the most vital messages, intercepted before 7 December 1941, were sent in to Washington by Hawaii. General Powell, however, states he was not aware of the contents.

In the documentary evidence mentioned there is correspondence from War Department to Hawaii in June 1941 concerning a report of the Military Attache at Mexico City as to the Jap intentions to strike Pearl Harbor with midget submarines at the outbreak of hostilities.

h. *Jap Navy Task Force in Marshalls*: Short testified that he did not have this information. But, the contrary might well be true in view of the affidavits of Layton, Huckins and Shivers, in addition to the proof previously reported.

i. *Sufficiency of War Department warnings*: General MacArthur, who received information similar to that received by Short, stated in his affidavit, after reviewing the intercepts, that the War Department warnings were ample and complete for the purpose of alerting his Command for war.

Colonel Bicknell told Shivers the Army had been alerted when Shivers mentioned the alert he received from Hoover on 28 November 1941. (Shivers affidavit).

j. *Possible alarm to civilian population*: The affidavits of Marston and Shivers confirm the lack of ground for Short to fear any such alarm, in view of the experience of the all-out Herron alert of 1940.



3. *Miscellaneous*: Many rumors relating to Pearl Harbor had been circulated concerning information available to General MacArthur, reports by him to Hawaii, and the War Department warnings to him. These are set at rest by the affidavits of MacArthur, Sutherland and Willoughby.

4. *Wyman-Rohl investigation*: Concurrent with the foregoing, evidence was obtained at Hawaii and Leyte in exploration of certain leads.

5. *Progress and objectives*: I propose to complete the interviews of overseas witnesses by going to the ETO to develop some very important and promising leads. Those to be questioned on the Pearl Harbor phases include, among others, General Gerow, General Bedell Smith, General T. J. Betts, Colonel Rufus Bratton, Colonel Harold S. Doud, Colonel R. E. Schukraft and Colonel W. H. Tetley. This would include an investigation of new matters as well as of [261] those items previously discussed. It is felt desirable to leave as soon as possible in order that interrogation be done before the witnesses are further scattered or are perhaps unavailable later.

Certain overseas witnesses pertinent to the Wyman-Rohl investigation would also be interviewed, thus completing the overseas phase of that investigation also.

I am keeping in touch and cooperating in a reciprocal manner with the Navy on additional investigation.

When my investigation is completed I shall make a comprehensive critique and report of all the new evidence then developed in relation to the Army Pearl Harbor Board Secret and Top Secret Reports.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Lt. Colonel, JAG.

[262]

CONFIDENTAL

#### HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

Box 3, APO 456

In reply refer to:

19 APRIL 1945.

Memorandum:

Subject: Photostated copies of C. I. D. files.

1. The following photostated copies of C. I. D. files were furnished to Col. Claussen as directed by the Secretary of War and the Commanding General, CPBC:

G-2, Hawn Dept. list Intelligence Reports prepared by Contact Office, Honolulu, T. H.

G-2, CID memo dtd 9/12/44 re Shinto Shrines and custodial detention of persons connected with shrines.

War Dept., Hq Army Pearl Harbor Board memo dtd 9/7/44 to CG, POA re Documentary Evidence.

G-2, Hawn Dept report re Japan, Foreign Relations & Domestic Conditions. (2 copies) (1 Dec 41)

Exhibit I—A Study of the Subversive Activities in the Hawaiian Islands Before, On, and After December 7, 1941.

Exhibit II—December Seventh and Before in the Hawaiian Islands Through the Eyes of the Press.

Hawn Dept. Summary of the Situation As of 7:30 A. M., 7 December 1941, dtd 12/22/41.

Transcript of Trans-Pacific Telephone Call to Dr. Motokazu Mori.

\*Radio from War Dept to G-2, Hawn Dept re Japanese negotiations, 11/27/41.

Informal report re Thailand.

Army Contact Office memo dtd 8/1/41 re Asama Maru and Conditions in Japan.

Radio from Short to AG, Wash. dtd 11/13/41.

Brief re Japanese Magazine Translation from the "Gendai", July 1941,



Army Contact Office memo dtd 5/2/41 re Comments on observations of a missionary.

Memo for Col. Bicknell dated 8/1/41 re Local Japanese Situation During the Period 26-31 July 1941.

Copy of radio received 11/27/41.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip re Information re Japanese Situation.

Radio from Naval Attache Tokyo to Asst Naval Attache Shanghai.

[263] Radio re speeches made by Military Naval Officials urging population to unite and serve empire.

War Dept ltr dtd 8/5/41 to G-2, Hawn Dept transmitting ltr from F. B. I. re Info on Japan's entry into war dtd 7/28/41.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Nov. 1941 re Military Attache Report No. 23 dtd 11/3/41.

G-2, H. H. D. Special Intelligence Report dtd 10/17/41 re New Japanese Premier Hideki or Eiki Tojo.

Army Contact Office memo dtd 11/21/41 re Seizure and Detention Plan (Japanese).

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Jan. 1942 re M. A. Report entitled "Activities of Foreigners in Country. Mexico." (Distribution list and M. A. report attached).

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Feb. 1942 re Japanese Residents of T. H.—Loyalty of—ONI report dtd 1/26/42 (attached).

Ltr from Hq. Second Corps Area dtd 11/28/41 re George Paish (Paisn). w/FBI report same Subject attached. (2 copies.)

M. I. D., War Dept. Summary of Information dtd 8/18/41 re French Indo-China.

M. I. D., War Dept. Summary of Information dtd 8/18/41 re Formosa.

M. A. Report dtd 8/14/41 re General Report, Countries in Pacific Area.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Aug. 1941, w/M. A. Report dtd 8/19/41 re General Report, Japan and China.

M. A. Report dtd 8/19/41 re Airports in S. W. Pacific and Australia.

M. A. Report dtd 9/10/41 re Japan and Japanese Relations.

M. A. Report dtd 9/25/41 re Thailand.

M. A. Report dtd 9/25/41 re French Indo-China.

M. A. Report dtd 10/2/41 re Japan.

M. A. Report dtd 10/23/41 re Formosa.

M. A. Report dtd 10/28/41 re Japan.

M. A. Report dtd 11/3/41 re Japan, Aerodromes and Aircraft (Continued).

M. A. Report dtd 11/18/41 re Japan, Military Agents.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Feb. 1942 w/14MD report dtd 2/9/42 re Fifth Column Activities at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Cable re-movements of fleet and return to Japan of members of diplomatic staff.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip w/WD Radio #628, 12/12/41 re Japanese Spy Activities.

Memo dtd 12/12/41 re Dormer windowed houses in Kalama.

14ND report dtd 2/9/42 re Espionage Activities at Japanese Consulate, Honolulu.

FBI memo to ONI dtd 1/4/42 re Japanese Consulate Activities.

Ltr dtd 12/3/41 from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

Extract from ONI report dtd 12/9/41 re Activities on Maui, Uanai & Molokai, since 7 December 1941.

[264] Report dtd 12/12/41 by R. C. Miller re Katsuro Miho.

Memo re ONI and FBI agents to Lanikai & Kalama to observe unusual activities.

Memo dtd 12/17/41 from R. A. Cooke Jr. re John Waterhouse House at Kailua.

Memo dtd 12/12/41 re Dr. Tokue Takahashi.

Extract from Army & Navy Register, 7/8/39—The Spy Game.

Four coded messages from Togo to Rijoji.

Army Contact Office memo for Col. Bicknell dtd 10/7/41 re Japanese Arrival In and Departure From Honolulu on Taiyo Maru.

M.I.D., Wash. ltr of transmittal dtd 8/28/41, w/ltr dtd 8/3/41 from George Paisn to Pres. Roosevelt re Japanese in Hawaii, Summary of Information dtd 9/30/41 re ltr, and H. H. D. ltr dtd 9/30/41 to G-2, 2nd Corps Area (reply thereto attached).

M. I. D., Wash. ltr of transmittal dtd 9/16/41, w/M. I. D. Summary of Information re Alleged exodus of Japanese.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Aug. 1941, w/ltr from Admiral Bloch to Gen. Short dtd 7/25/41.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd June 1941 re Unknown Subjects, Book Entitled "Three-Power Alliance and American-Japan War" by Kinoaki Matsuo, w/note attached.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd Jul 1941 re Small Japanese Submarines reported to be concealed in Shallow Water near Malokai, w/G-2, H. H. D. ltr of transmittal dtd 7/25/41 re Activities of Foreigners in Country-Mexico.

F. B. I. report dtd 10/9/40 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.

F. B. I. report dtd 11/6/40 re Rev. Unji Hirayama.

F. B. I. ltr dtd 3/19/42 re translations made of coded & confidential material from Japanese Consulate.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd 3/14/42 re Translation of a Register of Radiograms sent by Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. ltr of transmittal dtd 3/13/42 and report same subject attached.

F. B. I. report to F. B. I., Wash. 3/28/42 re notes found on desk pad at Japanese Consulate.

14ND report dtd 2/14/42 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.

14ND report dtd 6/15/42 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.

14ND report dtd 2/15/43 re Japanese Consulate, Honolulu—Espionage Activities.

G-2, H. H. D. ltr of transmittal to G-2, Wash. dtd 3/7/42 re Translation of Japanese Consulate Message Log Book, w/Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd 3/7/42 and F. B. I. report dtd 3/2/42 re same subject.

Inter-Staff Routing Slip dtd 4/2/42 re Photographs of Message Register of Japanese Consulate, w/F. B. I. ltr dtd 4/2/42 same subject.

[265] The aforementioned files were furnished to \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ on the \_\_\_\_\_th day of \_\_\_\_\_ 1945.

M. H. Sheward  
 M. H. SHEWARD  
 2nd Lt., M. I.

Receipt acknowledged.

SECRET

[266] FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,  
 DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL,  
 Honolulu, Hawaii, 19 April 1945.

RECEIPT FROM THE DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE 14ND IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED  
 FOR THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL:

1. Five (5) Secret Photostats (one positive and one negative of decoded cablegrams, from the Japanese Consul General, Honolulu, to Tokyo.

Listed are the dates and numbers of the above cablegrams in date order.

Date of Cablegram	Number of Cablegram
(a) 12/3/41	#363
(b) 12/4/41	#365
(c) 12/4/41	#364
(d) 12/5/41	#221
(e) 12/6/41	#368
(f) 12/6/41	#369

2. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copies of four (4) cablegrams all dated 11/27/41, to the following addressees:

- (a) SHAGRO, San Francisco
- (b) Dr. HOLMES, 45 Young Hotel, Honolulu
- (c) GROWSUMIDA, Honolulu
- (d) SHOKIN, Honolulu



3. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copies of four (4) cablegrams all dated 11/25/41, to the following addressees.

- (a) Rev. Hiro HIGUCHI, Waipahu Community Church, Waipahu, Oahu, T. H.
- (b) AMERICAN CONSUL, Papeete
- (c) Y. WATANABE, Box 511, Wailuku, Maui, T. H.
- (d) SHOKIN, Honolulu

4. One SECRET PHOTOSTAT of copy of coded and decoded cablegram dated 11/19/41, addressed to Inosuke HACHIYAE.

5. Four (4) Confidential 14ND, NNI-119 reports on the JAPANESE CONSULATE, HONOLULU—Espionage Activities, dated as follows:

- (a) 9 February 1942
- (b) 14 February 1942
- (c) 15 June 1942
- (d) 15 February 1943

6. One PHOTOSTAT (positive and negative) of each of the following SECRET intercepts:

- (a) 1-540; 11/30/41 & 12/1/41
- (b) NYK-38; 12/2/41
- (c) 6-1; 10/11/41

[267] 7. One Photostat (Positive and Negative) of the following: (Page numbers indicate DIO file page.)

- (1) Wilkinson report dated 18 October 1941—(No. DIO file page number.)
- (2) Wilkinson report dated 10/6/41, pg. 174.
- (3) Wilkinson report dated 9/16/41, pg. 173.
- (4) Wilkinson report dated 10/22/41, pg. 172.
- (5) Wilkinson report dated 10/17/41, pg. 171.
- (6) Cable received from Wellington, 11/25/41, regard Pacific Raider Intelligence, pg. 168A.
- (7) Memo for the files, dated 12/3/41, in reference to Wilkinson report dated 10/6/41, pg. 168.
- (8) Wilkinson report, not dated, pg. 166.
- (9) Wilkinson report, not dated, pg. 162.
- (10) Confidential letter to DNI from Com14, dated 10/14/41, Ser. #0965916, Subj.: "Transmission of Correspondence between British Intelligence Agent in Manila (16th Naval District) and District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. (British Agent in Manila—Information received from), pgs. 160-159.
- (11) Wilkinson report dated 9/3/41, pg. 158.
- (12) Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 157.
- (13) Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 156.
- (14) Wilkinson report dated 10/14/41, pg. 155.
- (15) Wilkinson report dated 10/13/41, pg. 154.
- (16) Wilkinson report dated 10/13/41, pg. 153.
- (17) Wilkinson report dated 10/11/41, pg. 152.
- (18) Wilkinson report dated 10/2/41, pg. 151.
- (19) Wilkinson report dated 9/29/41, pg. 150.
- (20) Wilkinson report dated 9/25/41, pg. 149.
- (21) Wilkinson report dated 9/26/41, pgs. 148-147.
- (22) Wilkinson report dated 9/24/41, pg. 145.
- (23) Wilkinson report dated 9/25/41, pg. 144.
- (24) Wilkinson report dated 9/23/41, pgs. 143-142.
- (25) Wilkinson report dated 9/14/41, pg. 140.
- (26) Wilkinson report dated 9/10/41, pg. 139.
- (27) Wilkinson report dated 8/28/41, pg. 134.
- (28) Wilkinson report dated 8/25/41, pg. 133.
- (29) Wilkinson report dated 8/23/41, pg. 132.
- (30) Wilkinson report dated 8/21/41, pg. 131.
- (31) Memo by T. W. Joyce, dated 11/5/41. (Notes & Comments), pg. 130.
- (32) Wilkinson report dated 10/4/41, pg. 129.
- (33) 14ND card #1536, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Shanghai French Concession—Japanese Designs on", pg. 121.
- (34) 14ND card #1534, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Thai—Japanese Activities in", pg. 120.

- [268] (35) 14ND card #1535, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Heito Airdrome", pg. 120.
- (36) 14ND card #1533, dated 9/31/41, Subj.: "Japan—General Intelligence", pg. 119.
- (37) 14ND card #1531, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japanese Fleet Organization", pg. 118.
- (38) 14ND card #1532, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Indo-China—Japanese Moves in", pg. 118.
- (39) 14ND card #1528, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japan—Ordnance Production", pg. 117.
- (40) 14ND card #1530, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Far East Exports to Germany", pg. 117.
- (41) 14ND card #1526, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "China Blockade—Smuggling", pg. 116.
- (42) 14ND card #1527, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Coastal Defenses", pg. 116.
- (43) 14ND card #1525, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa (Takao)—General Military Intelligence", pg. 115.
- (44) 14ND card #1523, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Conscription", pg. 114.
- (45) 14ND card #1524, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Troop Movements", pg. 114.
- (46) 14ND card #1520, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japanese—Troop Movements", pg. 113.
- (47) 14ND card #1521, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Japanese Troop Movements", pg. 113.
- (48) 14ND card #1522, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Supplies", pg. 113.
- (49) 14ND card #1518, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria—Travel Restrictions", pg. 112.
- (50) 14ND card #1519, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria—Censorship", pg. 112.
- (51) 14ND card #1516, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria Mobilization", pg. 111.
- (52) 14ND card #1517, dated 9/23/41, Subj.: "Manchuria Construction", pg. 111.
- (53) 14ND card #1482, dated 9/12/41, Subj.: "Hongkong—Prospective Disorders", pg. 97.
- (54) 14 ND card #1468, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Foreign Policy", pg. 95.
- (55) 14ND card #1470, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese—Siamese Relations", pg. 95.
- (56) 14ND card #1466, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Manchuria—Japanese Troop Movements", pg. 94.
- (57) 14ND card #1467, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Foreign Policy", pg. 94.
- (58) 14ND card #1465, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Manchuria—Railways, Buildings, etc.", pg. 93.
- [269] (59) 14ND card #1463, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Shanghai French Concession—Japanese Designs On", pg. 92.
- (60) 14ND card #1456, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Japanese Airplane Movements", pg. 90.
- (61) 14ND card #1457, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Formosa—Japanese Troop Movements", pg. 90.
- (62) 14NR card #1453, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Naval Ordnance", pg. 89.
- (63) 14ND card #1454, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Factory", pg. 89.
- (64) 14ND card #1455, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Troops in Indo China", pg. 89.
- (65) 14ND card #1450, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Troop Movement", pg. 88.
- (66) 14ND card #1451, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Naval Construction", pg. 88.
- (67) 14ND card #1452, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Naval Construction", pg. 88.



- (68) 14ND card # (?), dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Aircraft Factory", pg. 87.
- (69) 14ND card #1448, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Spratley Island—Japanese Construction", pg. 87.
- (70) 14ND card #1449, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "German Raiders in Pacific", pg. 87.
- (71) 14ND card #1444, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japan—Kobe Navy Yard", pg. 86.
- (72) 14ND card #1445, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Submarine Construction", pg. 86.
- (73) 14ND card #1446, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese Aerial Bomb Factory", pg. 86.
- (74) 14ND card #1442, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese National Policy", pg. 85.
- (75) 14ND card #1443, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japan—Airdrome at Kamakura", pg. 85.
- (76) 14ND card #1440, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japan—General Military and Naval Information", pg. 84.
- (77) 14ND card #1441, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japan—Underground Airdrome at Takarazuka", pg. 84.
- (78) 14ND card #1438, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese National Policy", pg. 83.
- (79) 14ND card #1439, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Philippine—Japanese Propaganda In", pg. 83.
- (80) 14ND card #1435, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Dutch East Indies—Japanese Propaganda In", pg. 82.
- (81) 14ND card #1436, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Saigon", pg. 82.
- [270] (82) 14ND card #1437, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Philippine-Japanese Business In", pg. 82.
- (83) 14ND card #1434, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Japanese National Policy", pg. 81.
- (84) 14ND card #1433, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Anti-American Measures by Japanese in Occupied China", pg. 80.
- (85) 14ND card #1431, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Indo-China", pg. 79.
- (86) 14ND card #1432, dated 9/9/41, Subj.: "Formosa", pg. 79.
- (87) Conf. Ltr. to DNI from DIO, 14ND, dated 9/20/41, Subj.: "British Secret Agent in Manila, exchange of information with", pg. 78.
- (88) Extract #61 for Honolulu, dated 8/8/41, pg. 71.
- (89) Extract #59 for Honolulu, dated 8/10/41, pg. 69.
- (90) Extract #57 for Honolulu, dated 8/19/41, pg. 67.
- (91) Extract #54 for Honolulu, dated 8/19/41, pg. 64.
- (92) Extract #52 for Honolulu, dated 8/21/41, pg. 61.
- (93) Extract #35 for Honolulu, dated 8/18/41, pg. 42.
- (94) Extract #33 for Honolulu, dated 8/16/41, pg. 40.
- (95) Extract #27 for Honolulu, dated 8/12/41, pg. 34.
- (96) 14ND card #1420, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "Japanese Repatriation", pg. 30.
- (97) 14ND card #1421, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "HULL, Amos Tyler, Jr.", pg. 30.
- (98) 14ND card #1417, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "DAKAR—Military Exercises", pg. 29.
- (99) 14ND card #1418, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "DAKAR—Attitude of Natives", pg. 29.
- (100) 14ND card #1419, dated 9/2/41, Subj.: "MOROCCO—Outgoing visas from", pg. 29.
- (101) Conf. Ltr. to Hd. of Domestic Intell. Branch, ONI, from DIO, 14ND, dated 8/22/41, Subj.: "British Secret Agent in Manila; information received from", pg. 27-26.
- (102) Extract #24, Subj.: "HULL, Amos Tyler", pg. 21.
- (103) Extract #20, dated 8/1/41, Subj.: "German S/S RAMSES", pg. 19.
- (104) 14ND card #1333, dated 8/15/41, Subj.: "JAPANESE MILITARY ARMOR", pg. 14.
- (105) Japan Military Body Armour, pg. 13.
- (106) 14ND card #1334, dated (?), Subj.: "Japanese Industrial Management", pg. 12.
- (107) Extract from letter from Manila, dated 7/12/41, pg. 10.

- (108) Factual Information regarding Japanese Professions, pgs. 9-7.
- (109) Extract #9 for Honolulu, dated 7/3/41, pg. 6.
- (110) Extract #10 for Honolulu, dated 7/2/41, pg. 5.
- (111) Extract #11 for Honolulu, dated 7/2/41, pg. 4.
- [271] (112) Extract #12 for Honolulu, dated (?), pg. 3.
- (113) Extract #13 for Honolulu, dated (?), pg. 2.
- (114) Extract #14 for Honolulu, dated (?), pg. 1.

B. One (1) Photostat (Positive and Negative) of each of pages 1, 3 and 5 of a copy of a broadcast from Station JZI (9535 Kc), dated 12/8/41 (Japanese time).

HENRY C. CLAUSEN  
Lt. Col., JAGD, U. S. Army  
For Army Pearl Harbor Board.

---

TOP SECRET

[272]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, 3 March 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy:

Subject: Investigation of Major Clausen, Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. *Activities reported:* Report is made of my investigation for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, during the period 17 February-3 March 1945, as follows:

a. *Army personnel interviewed as leads:*

Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C.  
Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. I.  
General Robert H. Dunlop, A. G.  
Colonel Edward F. French, S. C.  
Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, A. C.  
Lt. Ann Long, S. C.  
Miss Margaret McKenney, G-2.  
General Thomas North, OPD  
Miss Mary L. Ross, G-2  
Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, S. C.  
Mr. Smith, S. C.  
General Ralph C. Smith, G-2

b. *Navy personnel interviewed as leads:*

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort

c. *Affidavits obtained:*

Major Anderson  
Colonel Bicknell  
General Dunlop  
Colonel Jensen  
Miss McKenney  
Captain Rochefort  
Miss Ross  
Lt Colonel Rowlett  
General Smith

[273] d. *Conferences additional to foregoing:*

Mr. Harvey H. Bundy  
General Carter W. Clarke, G-2  
General Myron C. Cramer, JAGD  
Mrs. Foley, OPD  
Commander John F. Sonnett, USN

2. *Significant features of additional evidence developed:*

a. "Winds" code message: General Short contended and the Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that no information concerning this intelligence was available to General Short in the Hawaiian Department. For example, General Short stated in a letter to the Secretary of War: "Such information was not made available to me in the exercise of my command in the Hawaiian Islands." But it now appears probable that before 7 December 1941, both his G-2, Colonel Fielder, and his Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, received information of the "Winds"



code, and that his Assistant G-2 took action for the purpose of intercepting an execution message. If it is a fact that General Short did have available in his Hawaiian Department the information from the Navy as to intercepts of the "Winds" code message, this confirms the impression of General Marshall and Admiral Turner.

b. *Destruction by Japanese of codes:* General Short also contended that this information was not available to him. He attached more importance to this than almost any other intelligence. He testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry that had he received this information he would not have been led to attach much importance to not alarming the civilian population. In response to a question as to whether he would have gone into a different alert if he had received by telephone the 7 December 1941 message from General Marshall, he testified:

"I think I would because one thing struck me very forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. *The other matter wouldn't have made much of an impression on me.* But when you destroy your codes or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also: I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, the code machine would have been very significant, *the destruction of the code machine would have been very significant to me.* I would have been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter. \* \* \*

I would have taken the destruction of the code machines very seriously."

It now appears probable that both General Short's G-2 and his Assistant G-2 were informed before 7 December 1941 of the destruction by the Japanese of their secret codes and papers at Washington, London, [274] Hongkong, Singapore, Manila and elsewhere, and his Assistant G-2 saw the Navy Department message which so informed the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It will be recalled that this Assistant G-2 reported to Short's staff on the morning of 6 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls were destroying their secret papers. He, also, in the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, brought to the attention of General Short and his G-2 the fact that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message between a Japanese agent in Honolulu and a purported newspaper correspondent in Tokyo referring to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, weather conditions, "hibiscus" and "poinsettias" in the Hawaiian Islands. This information was not given to the War Department. It should be observed that the "Winds" code was to be implemented by a false weather broadcast as a signal for the Japanese Consuls and diplomatic agents to destroy codes and papers. Hence, knowledge of the "Winds" code arrangement, coupled with later information that the Japanese were destroying their codes and papers, would indicate that the "Winds" code had been implemented. Colonel Bratton sent the 5 December 1941 warning wire to the Hawaiian Department because he had received information of the destruction by the Japanese of their codes. This was an inferential notice of implementation of the "Winds" code. Since it now appears probable, subject to additional investigation, that Short's G-2 and his Assistant G-2 knew of the "Winds" message and of the destruction by the Japanese of their codes, it follows that there may have been available in the Hawaiian Department the same information possessed by the War Department.

c. *Inquiries and Reports on Ships in Pearl Harbor:* These were perhaps the most telling indications of the Japanese intentions. Two, which were very suspicious, dated 2 and 6 December 1941, were intercepted or received by the Army Signal Corps at Honolulu and mailed to Washington. The message dated 2 December 1941 was not received at Washington until 23 December 1941. Translations of these were therefore not available in time to be of any use as forewarning to Washington. Inquiry will be made at Honolulu as to all the circumstances, and whether anyone in the Hawaiian Department had prior knowledge of the tenor of these or similar messages. In this connection, I have discovered evidence that more than a week before 7 December 1941 the Navy arranged to receive and did receive copies of some commercial cables from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, which tied into the radio intercepts. Some were decrypted and translated before 7 December. Others, supposed to be the more suspicious ones, were not decrypted and translated until later. Copies of these are supposed to be at Honolulu. Short's Assistant G-2 was aware before 7 December 1941 that the Navy had made arrangements for receiving these copies.

d. *5 December 1941 message from G-2, War Department:* Colonel Fielder denied receiving this message. But it now appears probable that it was sent by Washington and received in Honolulu on 5 December 1941. The importance of this fact is that it was the War Department method of informing the Hawaiian Department of the "Magic" messages.

[275] e. *Alarm to civilian population*: General Short contended that this caution had been urged upon him by the War Department and was one of his reasons for his No. 1 alert. It now appears that General Short did not inquire of his staff, and ascertain in the experience of those on duty in 1940, as to what effect the Herron alert of 1940 had on the civilian population. Had he done so, he would have learned that the Herron all-out alert did not materially alarm the civilian population.

f. *Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November 1941*: General Short testified that the War Department had this in Washington when he sent his reply to the 27 November 1941 message from General Marshall. It now appears that the Standing Operating Procedure was not received in Washington until March 1942, and hence the War Department cannot be charged with prior knowledge thereof.

g. *Miscellaneous items*: Several administrative matters pertaining to the Army Pearl Harbor Board have been coordinated.

h. *Wyman-Rohl activities*: Exploration of further leads has been held in abeyance pending completion of Washington matters.

i. *Progress and objectives*: I shall develop some very important and promising leads in Hawaii and elsewhere when the studies in Washington have been completed, which is expected to be within the next two weeks.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.

TOP SECRET

[276] HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,  
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,  
Washington 25, D. C., 17 February 1945.

Memorandum for Mr. Bundy:

Subject: Investigation of Major Clausen, Supplementary  
to Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. *Activities reported*: During the period 3-17 February 1945, in pursuance of directives, I conducted for the Secretary of War investigations at Washington, D. C., supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, as follows:

- a. Army personnel interviewed as leads:
  - General Carter W. Clarke, G-2
  - Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury, G-2
  - General Charles K. Gailey, Jr., OPD
  - General Thomas T. Handy, D. C. S.
  - General Thomas North, OPD
  - Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, G-2
  - Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, S. C.
  - Colonel Eric H. F. Svensson, G-2
  - Miss Margaret McKenney, G-2

- b. Navy personnel interviewed as leads:
  - Captain Joseph J. Rochefort

- c. Affidavits obtained:
  - Colonel Dusenbury
  - Colonel Pettigrew
  - Captain Rochefort (being completed)

- d. Conferences:
  - Mr. Harvey H. Bundy
  - Major Henry A. Correa, IADB
  - General Myron C. Cramer, JAGD
  - Colonel William J. Hughes, Jr., JAGD
  - General H. I. Hodges, G. S. C.
  - Commander John F. Sonnett, USN

[277] e. *Studies of Navy Court of Inquiry and Army Pearl Harbor Board records, reports, and exhibits.*

2. *Significant features of additional evidence developed*:

a. Colonel Bratton had testified that he delivered decrypted and translated intercepts to various distributees immediately preceding 7 December 1941. Colonel Dusenbury stated in his affidavit that it was he who, almost exclusively, delivered the intercepts immediately preceding 7 December 1941.



b. Colonel Bratton had testified that he wrote the 5 December 1941 message from G-2, War Department, to G-2, Hawaiian Department, requesting that Commander Rochefort be contacted regarding a "Winds" broadcast. Colonel Dusenbury and Colonel Pettigrew stated in affidavits that this message was written by them.

c. Colonel Bratton testified that the thirteen parts of the Japanese reply to Hull, called by some witnesses a Japanese declaration of war, intercepted 6 December 1941, were delivered by him to the usual distributees on the evening of 6 December 1941. Colonel Dusenbury stated in an affidavit that he was on duty and waited that night for the receipt of the parts of this message and that when about half of it had come in, Colonel Bratton left for his home. Colonel Dusenbury further stated that none of the parts were delivered that night and that he, Colonel Dusenbury, delivered them the following morning, 7 December 1941.

d. Colonel Bratton testified that the Japanese message to deliver the Japanese reply to Hull at 1 p. m. on 7 December 1941, was received by him between 8:30 and 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941, and that he then called the home of the Chief of Staff. Colonel Dusenbury stated in his affidavit his impression that this message was received by Colonel Bratton between 9 and 10 a. m., 7 December 1941. This confirms the recollection of the Chief of Staff as to when Colonel Bratton made the telephone call to his quarters. This latter time element is also supported by testimony of Navy witnesses.

e. Colonel Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department, stated he had no recollection of receiving the 5 December 1941 message from Washington asking him to communicate with Commander Rochefort regarding the "Winds" message. He stated he did not have any knowledge of the "Winds" message. Commander Rochefort stated to me, and an affidavit to this effect has been prepared and submitted to him for execution, that since the Fall of 1941 he had very close liaison with his opposite number, Colonel Fielder; that he, Commander Rochefort, was monitoring at Hawaii for the implementation of the "Winds" message before 7 December 1941; that since this was of interest to the Army he did, before 7 December 1941, discuss with Colonel Fielder the "Winds" message as well as the destruction by the Japanese of their code and cipher machines in London and in Washington, and of secret papers in Honolulu, and any other important information of that character.

### [278] 3. Miscellaneous items:

I have coordinated several administrative matters pertaining to the Army Pearl Harbor Board

Admiral Kimmel by letter dated 6 February 1945 to the Secretary of the Navy requested a copy of the record of the Navy Court of Inquiry and an examination of the record of the Army Board of Investigation. The Secretary of the Navy replied by letter dated 12 February 1945 that the request so far as the Navy Court of Inquiry is concerned should be denied because courts of inquiry and other investigative bodies are convened for the purpose of informing the convening authority or higher authority of facts attending the matter inquired into, and furthermore, that the investigation has not been completed. So far as the Army Board of Investigation is concerned, the Secretary stated that this is a matter over which the Navy Department has no authority.

### 4 Wyman-Rohl activities:

In conjunction with the foregoing, investigations and conferences have been conducted and held by me on phases involving Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. These do not pertain to responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster, but some of the persons to be interrogated are in the same locations as those to be questioned in connection with the foregoing unexplored leads. The Under Secretary of War and The Judge Advocate General have directed that I conduct the appropriate additional investigation, including the development of leads suggested by the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

### 5. Progress and objectives:

It is intended to complete the examination of the Navy Board of Inquiry proceedings, to interview and confer with such other persons as are available locally, and then to gather such information elsewhere as is essential. When concluded, I shall correlate, digest, and, interpret the additional facts in relation to the Army Pearl Harbor Secret and Top Secret Reports.

Henry C. Clausen,  
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,  
Major, JAGD.